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Abstract: Digitalization and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in migration and mobility have
incrementally expanded over recent years. Iterative approaches to AI deployment experienced a
surge during 2020 and into 2021, largely due to COVID-19 forcing greater reliance on advanced
digital technology to monitor, inform and respond to the pandemic. This paper critically examines
the implications of intensifying digitalization and AI for migration and mobility systems for a post-
COVID transnational context. First, it situates digitalization and AI in migration by analyzing its
uptake throughout the Migration Cycle. Second, the article evaluates the current challenges and,
opportunities to migrants and migration systems brought about by deepening digitalization due to
COVID-19, finding that while these expanding technologies can bolster human rights and support
international development, potential gains can and are being eroded because of design, development
and implementation aspects. Through a critical review of available literature on the subject, this
paper argues that recent changes brought about by COVID-19 highlight that computational advances
need to incorporate human rights throughout design and development stages, extending well
beyond technical feasibility. This also extends beyond tech company references to inclusivity and
transparency and requires analysis of systemic risks to migration and mobility regimes arising from
advances in AI and related technologies.
Keywords: international migration; mobility; Migration Cycle; artificial intelligence; digitalization;
digital divide; COVID-19; human rights
1. Introduction
In the current era of online connectivity, described by some as the Age of Algo-
rithms [1], increasingly complex digital technologies including those related to artificial
intelligence (AI) underpin more and more everyday activities performed by people all
over the world. Substantial developments in computational power and data generation
have resulted in people’s daily lives being shaped through AI-related services and digital
interfaces, such as the personalization of newsfeeds, online advertising tailored to browsing
activity, interactive chatbot assistance and automated analytical updates. The range of
“smart” products using AI technologies has also grown, now covering appliances, vehicles,
houses and integrated voice assistants.
Routine activities in day-to-day lives around the world speak volumes of the recent
emergence of modern-day digital transformations. Sending e-mails, transferring money
to family back home, searching online for information and advice, posting comments on
social media and lodging e-forms through online platforms have become routine even in
the most geographically remote locations. This is especially the case for interactions related
to international migration and mobility, which is an inherently transnational phenomenon
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that has been shaped by social networks over hundreds of years often involving person-
to-person links built up over generations [2,3]. Over recent years, however, our social
and economic interactions have been increasingly mediated through digital systems and
processes, placing much greater emphasis on digital technologies and reducing the need
for personal interaction [4].
Alongside the impacts on individuals, the pressure on industry to digitalize has
resulted in every sector (and, to a lesser degree, all organizations) needing to transform
its systems, structures and processes toward data capture, storage, reporting and related
analysis. As part of these digital transformations, we have seen the management of
migration and mobility systems globally being affected by increased digitalization and
improving AI capabilities. The use of these data-driven technologies is not new, with
some countries having utilized AI in their migration management systems for more than
two decades, including as a means to manage rising demand for visa and travel-related
products and services [5]. AI is increasingly used throughout the Migration Cycle, for
example, to facilitate pre-departure identity checks, support online visa applications,
manage administrative decision-making, enable “smart” border processing, and produce
data analytics on travelers’ compliance with legal frameworks.
AI technologies can help people access up-to-date information in real-time, improve
system efficiency and reduce service times for clients. However, AI poses a variety of issues
for policymakers, practitioners and migrants, including concerns about technology-enabled
surveillance of individuals, the potential for systemic bias in AI decision-making in the
areas of migration and mobility, the increased interactions between public and private
sectors and their competing interests, and the negative impact of AI technologies on the
protection of human rights.
Data-driven AI technologies have also played a critical role in the fight against
COVID-19, especially during the initial months of the pandemic. Many governments
and businesses around the world quickly developed digital solutions to monitor public
health, such as mobile phone applications for contact tracing to support self-isolation strate-
gies aimed at minimizing transmission rates [6–8]. COVID-19, and the urgency related
to immediate responses, acted to further intensify the pre-existing pressures on industry
and States to ‘digitalize or perish’ [9,10]. It had become a matter of life and death, on a
large scale, and closely linked to the movement of people across borders as well as within
local communities.
This paper critically examines the implications of intensifying digitalization and AI for
migration and mobility systems for a post-COVID transnational context. First, it situates
digitalization and AI in migration by analyzing its uptake throughout the Migration Cycle.
Second, the article evaluates the current challenges and opportunities to migrants and
migration systems brought about by the deepening digitalization due to COVID-19, with
reference to human rights and international development. This is important because of the
widely recognized risks AI implementation poses to the adherence of human rights, most
especially concerning identity and privacy [11,12]. In addition, the potential impacts of the
“digital divide” extend beyond individuals and communities, taking in entire countries
beset by global inequalities. Further leaps in the roll-out of super technologies in migration
and mobility regimes, such as AI, risk further polarizing the potential for developing
countries to also realize a global mobility dividend.
In writing this paper the researchers conducted a review of the available literature on
this subject drawing from academic articles published in peer-reviewed journals, research
reports, and other relevant national and international government documents on migration
management, AI and COVID-19. Document analysis was used as the primary research
method, drawing on the available literature to provide new insight into the implications of
increasing digitalization and use of AI in migration and mobility systems for a post-COVID
transnational context.
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2. From Abstract Conceptualizations to Functional Realities: The AI and Migration
Story So Far
There is no universally agreed definition of AI. However, in a broad sense, it can
be thought of as “the programming of computers to do tasks that would normally re-
quire human intelligence” [13]. With its roots in computer science of the 1950s, AI was
initially conceived to convey the aspirational development of a computer that would de-
liver the high-level or cognitive capability of humans to reason and to think—otherwise
referred to as “general AI” [14,15]. More than six decades later, high-level reasoning and
thought remain elusive. Yet, AI technologies have developed over time to encapsulate
different streams that utilize machine capabilities for such work as natural language pro-
cessing, speech processing, machine learning, vision recognition, neural networks, and
robotics [16,17]. AI-based systems can be purely software-based, acting in the virtual
world (e.g., voice assistants, image analysis software, search engines, speech and face
recognition systems) or AI can be embedded in hardware devices (e.g., advanced robots,
autonomous cars, drones or Internet of Things applications) [14]. All of these AI technolo-
gies are relevant to migration and mobility systems, which operate in physical as well as
virtual spaces.
The long-term trend toward computer-based migration and mobility systems involv-
ing the capture of vast amounts of data on travelers, movements, regulatory decisions and
processes, has enabled the development and deployment of super technologies such as AI.
AI technologies have increasingly been used in migration since the late 1990s, including
in Australia, the United States, Japan and many European countries and by the European
Union [18–20]. Increasing volumes of administrative processing—such as visa applications,
airline check-ins, border point crossings—resulted in growing data repositories that were
challenging for governments to utilize. This challenge, combined with increasing security
risks associated with international travel particularly following the 9/11 terrorism attacks,
saw many countries pursue AI in migration and mobility systems that also involved a
distinct preference for optimizing security [20,21]. Early investments in machine learn-
ing and other analytical capabilities significantly enhanced States’ abilities to monitor
their borders and implement pre-entry detection systems, including by analyzing data on
hundreds of millions of border crossings amounting to many gigabytes of “unstructured
intelligence” [22]. It is also important to note that AI technologies rely on underlying
data capture and digital capabilities in order to be applied. “Digitalization” of aspects of
migration systems is, therefore, a necessary condition for the application of AI technologies.
However, digitalization does not necessarily result in AI technologies being developed and
implemented. Compared with digitalization, AI in migration and mobility is currently
much more limited, although it has experienced a surge in focus over the last 12–18 months.
To situate the analysis of digitalization and AI in migration, we apply the analytical
framework of the “Migration Cycle” [23,24] to demonstrate its broader applicability that is
much wider than the more obvious areas of border management and visa processing. The
increase in digital capture means that AI has been used throughout the Migration Cycle at
all stages: pre-departure, entry, stay and return (see Figure 1).
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However, an underlying profit motive means that much of the development and 
implementation globally is situated in high-income economies, resulting in profound 
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mobility systems [5].  
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As can be seen in Figure 1, the advancement of AI through the Migration Cycle has
extended beyond its initial focus on pre-departure and entry. Similarly, the expansion
has occurred alongside an increase in the variety of actors involved in the creation and
management of such systems, posing concerns for the data management and privacy of
highly sensitive information across various jurisdictions. These non-state actors span the
public and private domains including civil society, large corporations and agencies such
as airlines and ‘platform companies’ such as Facebook and Google [25–27]. Multinational
technology corporations that operate transnationally are increasingly involved in the devel-
opment of AI systems in migration, often for government clients, and their data collection
and analytical capabilities extend beyond borders and national boundaries. However,
an underlying profit motive means that much of the development and implementation
globally is situated in high-income economies, resulting in profound asymmetry between
countries in terms of the use of AI technologies in migration and mobility systems [5].
States with developed capabilities in AI technologies could thus be placed in a leading
position at the forefront of the global efforts to manage migration. Consequently, States
with less advanced technologies could be further isolated. S ch a situation could create
a ew paradigm, an AI divide, where y AI-capable States would set the agenda and
priorities for international migration management. That is partic larly relevant as States
viewed as more authoritarian regimes may be placed on the same si e of t AI divide
with traditional w stern liberal dem cracies, due to the development in AI capabilities
around the world. Such a scenario may have significant consequ nces for migration and
mobility, as the AI divide could either reinforce or, conversely, depart from the north–south
migration para igm [5]. The drive to accelerate the digital transformation and increase
AI capabilities in migration is also eeply influenced by th worldwide efforts to curb the
COVID-19 pandemic, as discussed in the next section.
3. Digital Technologies and AI throughout the Migration Cycle during COVID-19
Digital technology and AI interventions have advanced and taken new forms as a
result of COVID-19 m agement strategies to curb the spread of the virus such as contact
tracing, quarantine measures, and crowd surveillance. Using the Migration Cycle as a
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framework, this section examines these evolving technologies and the ways in which
migrants’ journeys are impacted by digital advances during the COVID-19 pandemic (See
Figure 2. COVID-19 Technological Interventions throughout the Migration Cycle).
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3.1. Pre-Departure: The Role of Mobility Data
From global data dashboards and neighbourhood maps to personal wearable tech-
nology, devices producing real-time data aimed to track and monitor the spread of the
virus and subsequently the movement of people has become all the ore significant during
COVID-19. The data produced by AI, mobility monitoring platforms and wearable tech-
nology helps to inform COVID-19 impact strategies, including lockdown easures, border
closures and other restrictions to move ent. Big tech companies have released mobility
data, for example, Google’s ‘community mobility reports’ and Facebook’s ‘movement
range trends’ report. Both companies emphasize that the aggregated data is anonymous
and based on users who opt in to share their location history, which is turned off by de-
fault [28,29]. Facebook (n.d.) describes how population density maps rely on data collected
from users and are combined with satellite imagery from machine vision AI and census
information. Such data sets are intended to inform public health officials and researchers
how people are responding to COVID-19 interventions such as social distancing measures
and lockdowns [30,31], however, limitations are revealed in assessing how accurately the
data represents the examined population as there is no information on the number of ‘users’
accounted for in the Google and Facebook outputs or if any strategies are applied in the
data analysis to account for demographic and/or other biases [32].
Mobility data are made available through mobile phones and also through wearable
technology, defined as “communication enhancing devices worn on the body that are con-
nected to an internet source”, for example, smartwatches and fitness trackers [6] (p. 90243).
These movement tracking devices are supported by Bluetooth, GPS, and GIS technologies,
which raises serious privacy concerns. Notably, there are few guidelines and regulations
about the use of this private data and what is entailed in information sharing [6]. Critical to
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the safety of individuals, private telecom companies maintain a database of these records
and authorities can gain access to users’ exact locations [27].
In the context of COVID-19, mobility data directly relates to the pre-departure stage
of the Migration Cycle due to its influence on the prediction and modelling of population
movement, tracking the spread of the virus, and subsequently implementing movement
restrictions. The acceleration of technology and use of big data and AI due to COVID-19
has direct impacts on migrants in the immediate and the foreseeable future [26,33]. Big
data, recognized for its ability to process high-volume information, from a variety of
sources and at a high velocity, enables decision making and process automation [34]. Big
data is currently being leveraged to monitor migrants approaching the border [33], with
experiments taking place at EU borders, for example, to predict population movements
and inform automated decision-making in immigration applications [26]. In keeping with
this trend, the ways in which big data analytics are being used to monitor movement at
border points will continue to intensify.
3.2. Entry: Increased (Bio)Surveillance
There is a range of technological interventions that migrants, and citizens alike, are
subject to at border points upon entry. Drone technology, which relies on AI applications,
for example, has become particularly significant in the context of COVID-19, due to its
ability to survey and observe crowds, conduct thermal imaging to screen for those with
a high body temperature, sanitize public spaces, and even carry essential medical sup-
plies [6,35]. Unmanned aerial vehicles have become a large part of migration management
technologies and are regularly used to monitor border sites [33]. The European Com-
mission’s ROBORDER project, is an example of how such technologies are advancing,
as the project seeks to create a “fully-functional autonomous border surveillance system
with unmanned mobile robots including aerial, water surface, underwater and ground
vehicles” [36]. These technologies have far-reaching human rights implications due to the
accumulation of private data and the lack of regulatory policies in place [26]. Additionally,
there are security risks as drones are vulnerable to GPS-jamming and hacking for users to
conduct criminal activity [6].
Integrated into drone technology and other surveillance devices is the capturing of
biometrics, the collection of data through “physiological or behavioral traits such as voice
recognition, fingerprints, retinal recognition or facial thermograms” [25]. Face scanners, for
example, are equipped with AI-based multisensory technology and have been adopted in
airports in efforts to identify individuals with symptoms of COVID-19 and limit exposure
to frontline staff [6]. These camera technologies collect real-time data and often rely
on AI machine learning to screen and diagnose individuals and produce research that
supports virus modelling and risk prediction [6]. The collection of biometric data raises
serious questions about how the data is stored, who owns it, who can access it, and
how it will be protected [25,26,37]. The increase of surveillance technologies that utilize
biometrics has given rise to “virtual” or “digital” borders which have great implications for
migration [25,37]. For one, biometric identifiers as a prerequisite for travel is expanding,
we see this especially in the context of COVID-19 with the requirements for proof of
vaccination and COVID-19 test results [38]. While there is no consensus on COVID-19
health status certificates as a prerequisite for international travel [39], the inequitable
vaccine access may act to reduce international mobility. Those unable to access vaccination
programs in developing countries will face obstacles to international travel, further to the
already significant visa restrictions [40]. In addition, vaccination registration and identity
verification may also deter migrants in an irregular situation from being vaccinated, which
may not only exclude them from access to COVID-19 certificates but also jeopardize broader
public health goals [41].
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3.3. Stay: Quarantine, Testing, and Healthcare Provision
Digital technologies have been incorporated into various COVID-19 management
strategies including mandated quarantine and self-isolation. Techniques employed in this
context have grave implications for migration and mobility systems. For example, in Tai-
wan, quarantined individuals were monitored through government-issued mobile phones
and tracked by GPS. If individuals breached their quarantine by crossing a “digital fence”,
a message was sent to the individual and individuals were issued fines [42]. Similarly,
many countries instructed individuals to download a mobile phone application to self-
report COVID-19 symptoms and self-isolate [43]. For migrants in particular, the collection
of personal data for public health purposes, raises concerns for their privacy and safety.
Immigrants have expressed concerns accessing COVID-19 related programs due to the fear
of exposing their immigration status [44,45]. Examples of extracting personal data from
mobile phones stem into migration and mobility management practices, as it is becoming
common among authorities to use personal electronic devices as a verification tool, gaining
access to call data, text messages, location history and more [26]. Advocates call for the
establishment of firewalls between health and immigration authorities to encourage the
uptake of COVID-19 technologies and protect the rights of migrants [45].
The digital transformation of healthcare provision has also uniquely informed mobil-
ity and migration systems and has implications for migrants themselves, especially when
it comes to accessing healthcare services. The application of health-related technologies
during the pandemic has been imperative to provide virtual care, track medication orders,
and communicate health information from wearable technology to healthcare profession-
als [35,43]. For example, in the United States, Kinsa Health, a technology company that
created smart thermometers that connect to a mobile application, generates daily maps
illustrating potential hot spots across the United States. Such technology works to track the
spread of the virus and inform public health safety measures, such as when to implement
movement restrictions, for example, curfews and lockdowns [46]. Additionally, COVID-19
has given rise to a suite of virtual healthcare services and telehealth platforms. While some
have been designed with migrants in mind, such as “Karim the Chatbot X2AI”, a program
created to deliver remote psychotherapy to Syrians in the Zaatari refugee camp [47,48], the
streamlining of remote healthcare services raises concerns for migrants who may lack access
to a stable computer and internet access, lack digital proficiency, and do not access available
services due to privacy concerns [49]. The use of digital technologies within migrant com-
munities prompts further reflection on the use of digital technologies during COVID-19
and how it exacerbates not only the “digital divide” with unequal access to technology and
networks but also inequality with lasting implications for health and security.
3.4. Return: Contact Tracing and the Digitalization of Visa Applications
According to the World Health Organization (WHO) contact tracing involves the
identification of individuals who have come in contact with an infected person(s), record-
ing the details of those individuals, and getting tested for infection [50]. The exercise
of contact tracing requires people to willingly have their personal details captured, of-
ten in a government-protected database, to help curb the spread of the virus [8]. From
large-scale surveillance cameras to mobile phone applications and wearable technology,
digital technologies have been adopted to aid the process of contact tracing. In South
Korea, for example, a combination of data is pulled from “security camera footage, facial
recognition technology, bank card records, and GPS data from vehicles and mobile phones”
to produce real-time data on people’s travel [43] (p. 436). Using a mobile phone application,
individuals are then notified of COVID-19 cases nearby and instructed to visit a testing
centre [43,51]. Singapore has also implemented a mobile phone application using Bluetooth
signals that allow individuals to keep track of who they are in proximity to. When an
individual is diagnosed with COVID-19, public health officials will access the data to
identify individuals who were in contact with the infected person [43,52]. While both
Singapore and South Korea have maintained record low COVID-19 mortality rates [43],
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for contact tracing to be effective, Oxford University researchers suggest that over half the
population would need to adopt the technology [53]. Utilizing contact-tracing applications
may be a challenge for migrants due to connectivity issues, and as a migrant advocacy
organization reports, migrants often share devices or lack a mobile phone all together [53].
COVID-19 disrupted forced and voluntary return procedures, however, to adapt to
various travel restrictions and office closures, many countries began to accept immigration
applications by post and email, issuing documents digitally [54]. There are drawbacks to
online systems including access to technology by applicants, data protection and quality
control [54]. The digitalization of migration management regarding online applications
and the issuing of visas existed prior to the pandemic. For example, Canada, the United
States, and the EU have been investing in AI algorithms to automate decisions on visa
applications [33]. The pandemic has heightened the need for digital services, and it is likely
the integration and adoption of digital technologies will continue to accelerate.
4. Implications for Migrants, Migration Trends and Migration Corridors
As discussed in the previous sections, digitalization and AI are increasingly becoming
a common feature of migration and mobility. The COVID-19 pandemic further accelerated
the adoption of technology-driven solutions that directly impact migration and mobility
systems. While technological innovation presents many opportunities, notably concerning
migrants’ access to information and services throughout the Migration Cycle, the potential
over-reliance on these technologies also brings about significant challenges. Two key
areas of interest can be highlighted in this regard, concerning the protection of migrants’
human rights, and the effects on long-term migration trends and the implications for
migration corridors.
4.1. Protection of Migrants’ Human Rights
While the challenges posed by the development of digital technologies and AI are not
exclusive to migration, the power imbalance between migrants and public authorities may
aggravate existing weaknesses in protecting their human rights. Two areas are of particular
interest—the potential for algorithmic bias to exacerbate inequalities and lead to unlawful
discrimination and the effects of increased surveillance on the protection of migrants’ right
to privacy.
First, research demonstrates that AI systems can reflect the biases of their human
creators [55–57]. For instance, bias may arise from a lack of representation and diversity
in datasets used to train AI algorithms [56]. For example, researchers found that due to a
lack of diversity in the datasets used for training commercially available facial recognition
algorithms, these were significantly less accurate when recognizing women’s faces with
darker skin types [58].
AI systems may also reflect structural and historical bias against minorities [57].
For instance, researchers demonstrated that AI systems operating sentiment analysis, a
technique allowing text to be marked as having a positive or a negative meaning, showed
significant race and gender bias [59].
While bias is not exclusively related to migration and mobility, the consequences for
migrants’ rights are significant. For example, if facial recognition technologies are used for
identification and identity verification of migrants, individuals with darker skin types may
be more exposed to inaccuracies and misidentification. If such mistakes are not corrected,
misidentification may lead to exclusion from access to assistance and services throughout
the Migration Cycle, and potentially, unlawful discrimination based on race [60].
Certainly, bias may go undetected in AI systems, particularly due to a lack of trans-
parency and auditability of proprietary AI algorithms—the so-called “black box” prob-
lem [11,61]. Yet, in areas where the evidence clearly indicates a high risk of bias, such as in
facial recognition technologies, it is possible to argue that authorities ought to know about
those risks. Suppose public authorities still deploy these AI systems for decision-making
concerning migrants without addressing the issue of bias. In that case, they may be ex-
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posing migrants to unlawful discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, or any other
protected characteristic (as per Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 24 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, and Article 3 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights) [62,63].
Second, as discussed in the previous sections, digital technologies, including AI,
contribute to the technologization of migration and mobility. Consequently, that can lead to
an intensification of migrant surveillance practices. In addition, the urgency surrounding
the COVID-19 pandemic has also led to public authorities increasingly experimenting with
digital technologies without due public scrutiny—with migrants and other marginalized
communities often more severely impacted [26,64].
Certainly, there are practical advantages in using digital technologies and AI in migra-
tion, for example, streamlining repetitive tasks requiring large amounts of data processing.
However, technology-enabled surveillance of migrants, notably at borders, can dispropor-
tionately interfere with their right to privacy [65].
Under International Human Rights Law, everyone has the right to respect for their
private life (as per Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights). This right is
also protected in the digital space, as “the same rights that people have offline must also be
protected online, including the right to privacy” [66] (para. 3).
The right to respect one’s private life encompasses telecommunications and electronic
data [67–72]. The protection of this right extends to non-nationals insofar as they fall within
the jurisdiction of a State party to an international treaty recognizing this right [73].
Yet, the right to privacy is not absolute. Public authorities may impose restrictions
insofar as these are not arbitrary. For instance, under Article 8, paragraph 2 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, restrictions must be adopted in accordance with the law,
follow a legitimate interest (such as national security, public safety, the prevention of
disorder or crime, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others) and satisfy the
tests of necessity and proportionality. In the EU, the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) also recognize restrictions on data protection, including in the interests of national
security and public security (Article 23 paragraph 1 of the GDPR).
Accordingly, public authorities should strike a fair balance between protecting mi-
grants’ right to privacy and increasing their digital and AI capabilities to support migration
management and border security and control. In addition to the impact on migrants’ rights,
digitalization and AI also have important effects on migration trends, as discussed below.
4.2. Effects on Long-Term Migration Trends and Migration Corridors
Digital technologies and AI are likely to impact international migration patterns over
time. If progressively more occupations become automated or replaced by computers, the
future of work and that of trends in work-related migration may be affected.
Research demonstrates that automation, AI and advanced robotics risk rendering the
recourse to many migrant workers obsolete in key destination economies [74–77]. Changes
in the nature of work within existing jobs, also motivated by the COVID-19 pandemic, may
force workers to be increasingly flexible, adaptable and focused on managerial and social
skills while machines and computers may take over a growing share of repetitive and
routine tasks. For instance, COVID-19 has accelerated the search for scalable automated
crop harvesting solutions utilising robotics in order to reduce the reliance on temporary
migrant workers [74].
Accordingly, less well-educated and low-skilled workers, who tend to undertake more
routine tasks, may be particularly affected by automation [75,76]. For example, in a report
focusing on Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, researchers found
that the automation of routine work is particularly relevant to low-skilled migrant workers
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in these countries. For instance, in the UAE, over 93% of automation potential may affect
jobs currently held by migrant workers [77].
Yet, research suggests that changes in work patterns may also affect professional
“white-collar” jobs and consequently, migration and mobility of skilled and high-skilled
migrants [78]. For instance, the bestowing of citizenship to the Sofia robot in 2017 by Saudi
Arabia may have signalled the country’s willingness to “fast-track” technological solutions
and to afford robots with status often unattainable by migrant workers [79].
5. Conclusions
Digitalization and AI technologies have been progressively utilized in migration and
mobility. As analysed in this paper, the advancement of AI and digital technologies through
the Migration Cycle has extended beyond its initial focus on pre-departure and entry. AI
and digital technologies are also a feature of stay and return programs and initiatives.
Examples include the digitalization of visa and asylum applications and processing, au-
tomated security checks at borders and AI-powered immigration information chatbots.
Digital technologies and AI in migration and mobility are likely to continue expanding in
the upcoming years.
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the need for better digital technologies to
support the management strategies aimed at curbing the spread of the virus. These included
digitalization regarding contact tracing, quarantine measures, and crowd surveillance.
Such advances in digital technologies have also impacted migrants’ journeys during the
pandemic. For instance, mobility data has played an important role in pre-departure
strategies as they were used to predict and model population movement, track the spread
of the virus, and subsequently, for decision-making concerning movement restrictions.
Similarly, the COVID-19 pandemic led to an increase in the utilization of drones relying on
AI applications and unmanned aerial vehicles for population and border surveillance.
While technological innovation presents many opportunities, notably concerning
migrants’ access to information and services throughout the Migration Cycle, the potential
over-reliance on these technologies also brings about significant challenges.
The protection of migrants’ human rights can be particularly affected by the advances
in digital technologies and AI, notably due to the inherent power imbalance between
migrants and public authorities. For example, algorithmic bias may exacerbate existing
inequalities and lead to unlawful discrimination, which can significantly affect migrants.
Similarly, the intensification of migrant surveillance practices has considerable effects on
the protection of migrants’ right to privacy.
In addition, digital technologies and AI are likely to impact international migration
patterns over time, affecting long-term migration trends and migration corridors. In partic-
ular, the potential for increased automation and AI in certain areas of work and occupations,
also motivated by the COVID-19 pandemic, may disrupt migration and mobility and even
render the recourse to many migrant workers obsolete in key destination economies.
Accordingly, human rights should be incorporated in the design and development
of digital technologies to mitigate potential risks to migrants’ human rights. Similarly,
decision-makers deploying these technologies should consider the systemic risks to migra-
tion and mobility regimes arising from advances in AI and related technologies. That is
even more crucial in light of the transnational implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for
migration and mobility.
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